Before and Beyond Divergence: A New Look at the Economic History of China and Europe [Book Review] by Wong, R. Bin et al.
Book Reviews 555
 In addition were the United States to lose its exorbitant privilege, it would become 
more like the United Kingdom and advanced countries with floating exchange rates 
that experienced this, or like countries such as Canada, Australia, and Sweden that 
never had exorbitant privilege. These countries have been able to borrow abroad in 
their own currencies since the 1970s.Their central banks have policy independence 
and can act as lenders of last resort during financial crises. The United States runs no 
risk of becoming an emerging market country again. The comparison between the 
United States and Korea is both farfetched and misleading. 
  I have some very minor quibbles. First, on page 24, Benjamin Strong was not at the 
Jekyll Island conference in 1910.1 Second, there is little discussion in chapter three 
about the Great Inflation of the 1970s and its connection to dollar instability. Third, 
the discussion of the 2007/08 crisis leaves out the role of U.S. housing policy and its 
possible connection to rising inequality. It also blames the repeal of Glass Steagall 
but doesn’t mention the consequences of investment banks going public. It also 
doesn’t mention that some countries like Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the 
Nordic countries avoided the crisis because they had sound banking systems and 
effective regulation. 
1 Wicker, Great Debate.
MICHAEL D. BORDO, Rutgers University
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 Before and Beyond Divergence is a model of collaboration and academic 
production: between two disciplines—economics and history and between two area 
specialists—an economic historian of Europe and a socioeconomic historian of China. 
 It is also a model of a new form of academic discourse. Relying on what the authors 
call “a number of small sharp theories,” instead “of one big theory,” (p. 230) 
Rosenthal and Wong produce a deceptively simple answer “political processes drove 
the economic divergence between the two world regions” to the big question which 
motivates the entire book: “Why did sustained economic growth arise in Europe rather 
than in China?” (p. 228). Deceptive because their answer is actually quite complicated. 
They offer at least six different answers ranging from demography to geography to 
finance to political economy and devote as much space to demolishing previous 
answers instead of supplying their own beyond the geographic and political economic 
explanations advanced by their own research and the relative price explanations 
?
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of Bob Allen and colleagues.? Deceptive because their narrative mode is equally 
complicated. The authors mix history with economics and write what is really a 
unique narrative interweaving descriptive historical narrative and qualitative and 
quantitative exercises in economic logic. And deceptive because while the authors 
modestly say they focus on the economic history of two subcontinents, Western 
Europe and China, for just one millennium between 1000 and 1800, their discussion, 
in fact, ranges freely when relevant as far back as the Roman Republic and Former 
Han Empire and as far forward as the present-day.  
 There is much to admire, much to emulate, and much to hope for—if the authors 
can be persuaded to continue such collaboration and if others can be truly persuaded 
to emulate this mode of academic argumentation, collaboration, and production. 
These sorts of collaborations offer the greatest probability of moving the academe 
from local and/or national studies to comparative and global studies, and from 
disciplinary insularity to interdisciplinarity—goals the academe has espoused for over 
half a century but hardly ever achieved. 
 Moreover, I believe that it is only through such sort of narratives that economic 
historians can engage the larger academe and reading public. 
 Inevitably most scholars will find the most fascinating part of the book to be the 
discipline furthest away from their area of expertise—in my case since I am a historian 
and sociologist, that would be the economics—and the most occasionally problematic 
part of their argument to be the area closest to their own—in my case comparative 
social demography, Chinese history, and Chinese studies. 
 I do wish, for example, that chapter 2 on the household took more note of recent 
international collaborative work focusing on Malthusian issues, household context, 
and individual outcomes.?
 I also question that “the area in which rigorous population reconstructions can 
be made have been limited to parts of northeast China” (p. 41), when the most 
comprehensive and reliable historical demographic studies in fact come from the Qing 
imperial nobility who resided almost entirely in Beijing.?
 I also wonder if the contrast between Chinese domestic peace and West European 
international conflict is not overdrawn. Is it really true that the number of walled and 
gated Chinese cities was limited relative to Europe (p. 113) and that especially after 
1000 domestic social order did not entail large investments in fortifications? What 
about the project in late-eighteenth-century China to rebuild and renovate the city 
walls for over 1,500 county seats and commanderies? And what about the Ming Great 
Wall and all its related fortifications which while not purely domestic, certainly falls 
within China’s current national boundaries? 
 And what’s up with the map of the Han Empire from 207 to 220 AD, which unlike 
their parallel map of the Roman Empire in the second century AD, tries to summarize 
all four hundred years of the Han Empire from 206 BC to 220 AD (p. 14). 
 Finally, given that Bin was colleagues with Wang Feng for fifteen years, can’t we 
please remember that his surname is Wang and his given name is Feng? (p. 40). 
 More broadly, I find it surprising that the authors essentially ignore human capital 
issues beyond crude wages when discussing economic growth since the capital 
intensive technological processes they describe for Europe must have human capital 
? Allen et al., “Wages.”
? Bengtsson et al., Life Under Pressure; and Tsuya et al., Prudence and Pressure.
? Lee, Wang, and Campbell, “Infant and Child Mortality”; and Wang, Lee, and Campbell, 
“Marital Fertility.”?
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implications as well as implications for our understanding of contemporary and future 
economic growth. 
 I wish Rosenthal and Wong also had allowed more space for human agency in their 
multi- and especially meta-narratives—not just the active agency of specific decisions 
and individuals in their economic models, but also the unconscious or passive agency 
of decisions made according to existing customs or institutions. Since such agency 
is assumed, indeed central, too much of their economics, it is puzzling that agency 
is missing in their history. Indeed, if political processes are as important as the 
authors suggest—and I see no reason to doubt this overall conclusion—then 
shouldn’t important political decisions play some role in these processes, even if the 
consequences for sustained economic growth are unintended?  
 I also wish Rosenthal and Wong were able to better integrate individual and 
community micro-studies into their more macro and theoretical overall approach, 
and for that matter to show more appreciation for inductive reasoning which generally 
shows poorly in their narratives, compared to deductive reasoning, especially in their 
description of past scholarship.  
 But these are quibbles in face of an exciting, subtle, nuanced ambitious analysis 
that requires multiple readings and never fails—I am on my third reading—to produce 
new insights of important global processes and to provoke readers to expand 
our understanding of our world today as well as Before and Beyond Divergence.
Given the authors’ ambitions—to contrast the economic history of two continents for 
one millennium in 240 pages—it is hardly surprising that this book cannot be all 
things to all people.  
 Unlike other recent successful exercises in comparative economic history which 
compare Western European and East Asian communities? or regions?, Rosenthal and 
Wong compare the entire Chinese and Western European subcontinents. In so doing, 
they sacrifice the detail and completeness of micro- or mesa-history for the relevance 
of macro-spatial history. We need such spatially ambitious comparisons both to help 
us frame “smaller” narratives and to help us understand global narratives. 
 The world economy is moving forward so much faster than our ability to explain 
such processes. It has taken ten years to advance from Ken Pomeranz’s The Great 
Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy (2000) to 
Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and R. Bin Wong’s Before and Beyond Divergence (2011).
I hope we as an academe are able to quicken our pace and move further beyond 
Divergence, and for that matter Convergence too, to understand better the world we 
have gained as well as the world we have lost. Rosenthal and Wong are an important 
step forward to such global understanding. 
? Bengtsson et al., Life Under Pressure; and Tsuya et al., Prudence and Pressure.
? Li, Early Modern Chinese Economy; and Pomeranz, Great Divergence.
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GENERAL AND MISCELLANEOUS
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Global Economic History is listed as title number 282 in Oxford’s Very Short 
Introduction series. It is numbered just after such titles of moment as Jesus, Viruses,
Derrida, Madness, and Dictionaries. Titles with at least tangential relevance to 
economic history did weigh in considerably earlier such as Marx at 28, Engels at 91, 
and perhaps of more pertinence, Capitalism at 108, and The Great Depression and 
New Deal at 166. Robert Allen, quite undaunted by such ordering, opens this volume 
by trumpeting economic history as “the queen of the social sciences.” 
 On the inside front flap, Oxford’s Very Short Introductions are described as aspiring 
to be “expert, concise, but far from bland.” Allen has produced a volume that complies 
with all three criteria. He does not shy away from offering provocative generalizations 
while displaying admirable command of literatures spanning a broad chronological 
and geographical range. At almost 150 pages, albeit duodecimo ones, and organized 
into nine chapters, Allen’s book provides more depth than one might expect from the 
“very short” moniker. Yet his exposition is pithy and lucid.  
 As Allen suggests, cliometricians have been particularly active in recent years in 
engaging with global perspectives. Whereas in the early days of cliometrics some ?
fifty years ago, efforts at quantification focused on the United States and Britain, ?
more recently they have been active in developing quantitative sources for China, the 
